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1 Introduction
Since the financial crisis began in 2008, in many countries there has been greater attention
to the diversity in companies’ boardrooms, even though only a modest increase in the
percentage of women in these positions can be observed worldwide. After analyzing 4,200
companies around the world, GovernanceMetrics International found that the percentage
of female board members increased marginally between 2009 and 2011, from 9.2 to 9.8%
(GovernanceMetrics International (GMI) 2011).
The public discussion in Germany has also noted for some time that there are too
few women in German top management positions. German policy has recognised this
issue at least since 2001 when the German Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior
Citizens, Women andYouth enacted the agreement on the promotion of gender equality in
the German private sector. However, the impact of this agreement has not been satisfactory
(Holst and Wiemer 2010). Therefore, further possible solutions remain a topic in the public
discussion. The German Corporate Governance Codex requires the consideration of an
adequate level of diversity when appointing management and supervisory board members
(Weber-Rey 2009). In addition, the option of a hard quota law following the example of
Norway is frequently discussed. At a company level, the German Telekom was the first
DAX company to introduce an internal quota law in 2010 (Holst and Wiemer 2010). Today,
20% of the companies listed in the DAX are committed to an internal quota regulation.1
At the same time, researchers have focused more and more on female board represen-
tation. They have found evidence that while it is important for companies to have women
on management teams, they are underrepresented—especially among top managers and
board members (Adams and Ferreira 2009; Daily et al. 1999; Hillman et al. 2007). The
identification of the factors supporting the presence of women on boards is essential (Hill-
man et al. 2007). Naturally, one of the most influential institutions involved in decisions on
the corporate governance structure are the companies’ owners.2 Drawing on the assump-
tions of the classical agency theory, they rely on finding an adequate representative of their
interests as manager. This search might have interesting effects on the gender diversity
among board members.
Among existing investigations of the ownership impact on board diversity the following
gaps can be identified: Since different types of owners generally have different interests,
a detailed distinction of the impact of different types of owners on the presence of women
on the management board is indispensable. While there are some studies that focus on
the impact of a specific type of owner—the institutional investors—on board diversity
(Carleton et al. 1998; Farrell and Hersch 2005), no holistic examination of different owners
exists. This holds first, concerning the type of owner and second, concerning the geographic
origin of the owner. We close these gaps by first distinguishing between families, banks and
insurance companies, strategic and institutional owners and by second separating domestic
and foreign owners. From a German point of view, an additional gap is the general lack
of a representative empirical analysis of corporate governance drivers for the presence of
women on management boards. We close this gap by analysing 15,976 management board
member positions including approximately 600 German-listed companies from 2000 to
2007.
In this paper, we focus on the following three research questions: First, does ownership
concentration affect the presence of women among management board members? Own-
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ers with large shares have a stronger influence on strategic decisions in the companies
they own. Large shareholders are more involved in the process of appointing manage-
ment board members and therefore prevent the reproduction of the same male elite in
German top management positions. Second, do specific types of owners focus more on
management board diversity than others? For example, institutional investors such as in-
vestment funds and private equity investors have a higher impact on strategic decisions
and changes in corporate governance patterns (Thomsen and Pedersen 2000). Third, do
differences exist between the impacts of foreign and national institutional investors on the
representation of women in management boards? While German institutional owners are
mostly subsidiaries of German banks or insurance companies (Böhler et al. 2010; Edwards
and Nibler 2000), foreign institutional investors can be considered as the classical, active
owners and specialised investors whose success is measured by the success of their invest-
ments (Thomsen and Pedersen 2000). They are even more reliant on trustworthy corporate
governance structures, since they are generally exposed to higher monitoring costs (Leuz
et al. 2009). Hence, we expect mainly foreign institutional investors to positively affect
the presence of female managers.
Our study contributes to literature in three dimensions: understanding of the influence
of ownership structure on strategic decisions, drivers of board diversity and the German
corporate governance system. The term diversity can thereby cover a multitude of di-
mensions. Demographic diversity attributes such as race, age, gender can be considered,
as well as educational and functional background (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987;
Pelled 1996; Simons et al. 1999). However, researchers have identified gender as the
strongest driver for stereotypes and categorisation behaviour (Hollingshead and Fraidin
2003). For this reseaon, we pay special attention to this dimension and use the terms
diversity and gender diversity interchangeably. We extend the existing literature on the
influence of ownership structure on company performance and strategic decisions made
in companies (Anderson and Reeb 2003a; Andres 2008; Barclay et al. 2009; Kronborg
and Thomsen 2009; Renneboog 2000) by the dimension of management board diversity.
We show that the influence of owners on board diversity does not depend on their concen-
tration, but rather on the specific type of owner. We thereby extend the classical agency
theory based research on the owners as principals and the managers as agents (Fama and
Jensen 1983) by an additional dimension for conflicts of interest: while managers want to
demographically “reproduce” themselves, owners are interested in implementing state-of-
the-art corporate governance structures. Concerning drivers of board diversity, we provide
a unique investigation of ownership microstructures, such as the impact of international
institutional owners on the acceptance of women on management boards. Thereby, we
clearly extend the results of Farrell and Hersch (2005) and Carleton et al. (1998), who do
not distinguish between national and international owners. We also enhance the research
community’s understanding of the German corporate governance system with our unique
data set. Based on 5,203 company years and a consideration of 15,976 management board
member positions, our study is the first representative empirical analysis of women on
German management boards and the variables associated with their presence.3
The paper is structured as follows. Part two gives an overview of the existing literature.
Part three outlines the theoretical framework and introduces the hypotheses. Our sample
and the variables used are explained in part four. In part five, we present our empirical
results and the robustness checks. Finally, part six concludes our study and discusses the
results.
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2 Literature review
Academic research of women on corporate boards can generally be classified into two
groups: the first group of papers analyses the impact of top female managers on compa-
nies’ performance and decision quality while the second group focuses on drivers and
detractors of women on corporate boards. To give an overview of the existing literature,
we summarise the current status of research results in the first group and continue with a
detailed description of the placement of our paper within the current results of the second
group.
Research on the impact of female managers on company performance and decision
quality is generally driven by two arguments. The first argument is that women represent
additional human capital for top management positions that is as yet unused (Westphal
and Milton 2000). By not considering one half of society for its management positions,
companies generally lose a large pool of potential intelligence (Brammer et al. 2009;
Oehmichen 2010). The discriminated minority therefore becomes demotivated (Brammer
et al. 2009) and unlikely to invest in its human capital (Becker 1985; Coate and Loury
1993). The second argument is that diversity enhances divergent thinking and thereby
improves the quality of decisions made by the management board (Aretz and Hansen
2003; Hillman et al. 2007; Lederle 2007). An increased share of women in management
can increase the pool of points of view, knowledge, skills and experiences. Furthermore, via
an extended intellectual spectrum, the comprehensive range of experience and creativity
can be strengthened (Arfken et al. 2004). Additionally, the acceptance of the company in
employee and product markets can be improved by increased legitimacy through board
diversity (Daily et al. 1999; Hillman et al. 2007). However, these expected advantages of
diversity are accompanied by potential costs, such as insufficient communication (Ferreira
2010; Kilduff et al. 2000) or the decrease in psychological attachment to the company (Tsui
et al. 1992). The aggregate effect of diversity depends on the company’s environment
(Goodstein et al. 1994). Empirical studies on the impact of female board members on
company performance yield ambiguous results. Cater et al. (2003) found a positive (Carter
et al. 2003), whereas Adams and Ferreira (2009) found a negative effect (Adams and
Ferreira 2009) on performance.
The existing literature on drivers and detractors of female careers and especially of
women on corporate boards covers country-specific institutional (Straub 2007; Terjesen
and Singh 2008) and company-specific organisational aspects (Fryxell and Lerner 2009;
Harrigan 1981; Hillman et al. 2007). Research on the country level shows that the presence
of women on boards strongly depends on countries’social, political, and economic patterns
(Terjesen and Singh 2008). Countries that adopt the cultural norm of stay-at-home mothers,
in other words women delaying their careers in order to keep their husband’s options open
or to educate their children, have lower percentages of women in management positions
(Tharenou 2008).The possibility to deduct housekeeping expenses from income tax on
the other hand is a significant country-wide incentive for women to occupy management
positions (Henrekson and Stenkula 2009).
Among company-specific organisational drivers, we distinguish between industry af-
filiation, company characteristics and corporate governance characteristics. Two kinds of
industry effects are possible: the availability of more female employees in specific indus-
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tries (Hillman et al. 2007), and the social pressure of more female customers in some
industries (Fryxell and Lerner 2009). Harrigan (1981), one of the first academic authors to
address drivers of female directors, using an US-American sample, found certain indus-
tries such as pharmaceuticals, cosmetics and chemical processing to positively affect the
likelihood of women being members of the board (Harrigan 1981). Companies affiliated
with an industry with more female customers are expected to have a higher percentage
of female managers in order to provide higher credibility in the product market. Having
no female manager can have a destructive effect on the company’s reputation among its
female customers. Fryxell and Lerner (2009) identified in their US-American sample food,
drug and cosmetic product groups as companies with a higher rate of acceptance of female
board members because they recognise that these are industries with augmented numbers
of female customers (Fryxell and Lerner 2009). Though industry affiliation is not part of
our hypotheses, we control for it in our multivariate models (Farrell and Hersch 2005).
Company characteristics that might influence the presence of female managers are
organisational details, such as company size, as well as concrete activities the companies
undertakes to increase the percentage of women among their managers. Empirical results
regarding the effect of company size on the acceptance of women on boards are mixed.
Harrigan (1981) detects a negative effect between company size and women board mem-
bers, whereas the more current publications of Hillman et al. (2007) and Farrell and Hersch
(2005) observe a positive effect. This trend however is not surprising; female managers
have gradually moved to the fore of public opinion in the last 10 years and the resulting
social pressure is most relevant for large companies. Specific programs that companies
can engage in to increase the percentage of female managers include the following: the
introduction of diversity responsibilities such as a diversity commissioner, the elimination
of distorted perceptions of female managerial abilities via trainings and workshops, pro-
grams to facilitate the integration of work and family activities, and the reduction of social
isolation via mentoring programmes and networking events (Kalev et al. 2006; Krell 2008;
Noe 1988; Süß 2008).
Corporate governance structures that might drive or detract female managers from top
management positions are the board and ownership structure. Research results concerning
the impact of the board structure include the following: In their 2SLS regression analysis,
Carter et al. (2003) identified board size as a positive driver for the presence of women on
boards. Conversely, the number of inside directors negatively affects the presence of female
directors. Their results are based on an empirical analysis of 638 US-American companies
for only one cross-section (Carter et al. 2003). Farrell and Hersch (2005) questioned which
kind of director a woman is most likely to replace on the board. They discovered that a
departing woman increases the likelihood of another woman being added. Furthermore,
Farrell and Hersch controlled for board size. Hillman et al. (2007) extended these analyses
by investigating whether there is an expected positive effect of an “outside female director
link”. They show that boards that network with other female board members have a positive
impact on the acceptance of female board members.
The impact of owners on the presence of women on boards is mainly covered by Car-
leton et al. (1998) and Farrell and Hersch (2005). Carleton et al. (1998) investigated the
general impact of institutional investors on corporate governance decisions. Within these
analyses, they found some significant influence of institutional investors (TIAA-CREF in
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their case) on the gender diversity of boards (Carleton et al. 1998). Farrell and Hersch
(2005) came to the same conclusion: they show that the percentage of institutional owner-
ship has a positive impact on the appointment of women as directors (Farrell and Hersch
2005). They also showed that institutional investors seem to generate some outside pres-
sure for more board diversity. Farrell and Hersch included banks and insurance companies
in their definition of institutional owners but disregarded other types of owners, which
could also influence the appointment of female directors.
This is where we fill the research gap. From an agency theoretical perspective, it is
important to consider different dimensions of the major interests of different types of
owners and to follow different attitudes concerning the importance of women on boards.
Therefore, we extend their findings in three ways. First, in our analyses of the impact of
ownership structure on the presence of women on management boards4 we further separate
the definition of institutional investors into investment funds, private equity funds and
venture capitalists on the one hand, and banks and insurance companies on the other hand.
Second, we add strategic and individual owners to our models, and third, we distinguish
between national and international institutional investors. We thereby close an existing
gap, since the current research offers little detailed guidance as to “why some companies
do have female representatives on their boards and others do not” (Hillman et al. 2007).
Our research is of (Barth et al. 2005) additional relevance for research on general
ownership effects. Many papers investigating the impact of shareholders focus on the
effects on a company’s performance (Anderson and Reeb 2003a; Himmelberg et al. 1999;
Morck et al. 1988) instead of looking for concrete strategic decisions that active owners
could influence. Strategic dimensions covered so far include dividend payout (Barclay
et al. 2009), corporate diversification (Anderson and Reeb 2003b; Denis et al. 1997),
productivity (Barth et al. 2005) or company leverage (Anderson and Reeb 2003b). By
analysing shareholders’ effects on the acceptance of female managers, we add a further
exemplary strategic decision to this area of research.
3 The impact of the ownership structure on the presence
of female managers: hypotheses
Many researchers have investigated the impact of ownership structure over time. The
foundation was laid by Berle and Means (1968), who observed the following effects of
the separation of ownership and control, a trend that started in the 19th century. Owners
turn from active to passive agents, the spiritual value of ownership is replaced by its
monetary value and the owners lose their active influence on their personal wealth (Berle
and Means 1968). The resulting conflicts of interests between owners and managers, as
well as possible dimensions for owners to reduce their agency costs, find consideration in
many academic publications (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen 1986, 1993; La Porta et al.
2000; Shleifer and Vishny 1997).
Many studies on the effects of ownership characteristics focus on the influence of
ownership structure on a company’s performance (Anderson and Reeb 2003a; Edwards
and Weichenrieder 2004; Franks and Mayer 2001; Himmelberg et al. 1999). They often
presume that owners with larger shares have lower agency costs of monitoring, exert more
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influence over the companies’ management and therefore increase their company’s value
(Edwards and Weichenrieder 2004; Jensen and Meckling 1976).
To examine the impact of owners on questions of board composition, we first need to
understand the preferences of management board members. These (primarily male) board
members stick to certain behavioural structures when deciding on a new colleague or
successor. They try to reproduce themselves and thereby follow a so called homophilous
behaviour. This means that an individual is acting in favour of other individuals that
are similar to himself (Pearce and Xu 2010). To determine similarity, individuals revert
to demographical attributes such as race, age or gender (McPherson and Smith-Lovin
1987). Given an atomistic ownership structure, managers are exposed to fewer obstacles
and are enabled to continue this self-producing behaviour. Under an atomistic ownership
structure, the managers’ idea of future colleagues is opposed to many different interests
of the many minority shareholders. From a group-theoretical perspective, the probability
that they agree on the same candidate is very low. Large groups tend to get involved in
more conflicts than small groups (Forbes and Milliken 1999). The managers’ risk of a
reclamation of the shareholders against the managers’ candidate is therefore lower for the
case of dispersed ownership. But a single or a few large owners are expected to have fewer
conflicts in the decision process on suitable candidates and to exert their influence on the
decision on management board composition. These influential owners appoint candidates
that they expect to best represent their interests. Thereby it is possible that the owners’
candidate does not fit the existing stereotypes. The blockholder might be an obstacle for
the homophilous request of the existing management and is therefore more capable to
change existing patterns such as that of male dominance on management boards. A higher
ownership concentration consequently results in greater board diversity.
H1: A higher ownership concentration of a company is associated with a higher probability
of having at least one woman on the management board.
One basic assumption of hypothesis 1 is that owners influence the appointment process of
management board members and choose those kinds of managers that they expect to best
represent their interests. However, those interests might differ among the different types
of owners. In short, different types of shareholders have different agendas (Kim et al.
2008; Thomsen and Pedersen 2000). For example, the level of emphasis that an owner
places on company performance depends on the ownership type (Chaganti and Damanpour
1991). We distinguish between individual owners (including families), bank and insurance
companies, strategic investors such as non-financial corporations5 and governmental or-
ganisations, and institutional investors such as investment funds, venture capitalists or
private equity companies (Dharwadkar et al. 2008; Thomsen and Pedersen 2000).
Individual and family owners are mainly interested in the survival of the company
(Berrone et al. 2010; Sraer and Thesmar 2007). Generally, they do not have the opportu-
nity to invest in more than one company due to liquidity restrictions (Anderson and Reeb
2003b). Therefore, their risk aversion is assumed to be high (Andres 2008). One of the best
ways to ensure their company’s survival is to maintain a highly productive and stable per-
formance (Anderson and Reeb 2003a). To enable and sustain this high performance level,
family owners strongly depend on managers who represent their best interests. Hence, they
often fall back on family members as their managers (Bennedsen et al. 2006; Cucculelli
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and Micucci 2008). Concerning the impact of family ownership on the percentage of fe-
male managers, supply arguments are the strongest drivers (Farrell and Hersch 2005). The
pool of potential female managers is naturally higher, since on average, half of a family’s
members are women. We therefore expect the presence of women in management boards
to be higher for companies with individual and family owners.
H2a: The more shares are owned by individuals and families, the higher is the probability
of having at least one woman on the management board.
Banks and insurance companies, as well as strategic investors, often have objectives that
go beyond the maximisation of their share value. They can optimise their own benefits
by improving existing business relations with the company they have invested in. For
example, banks may decide to promote their own business as viable lenders and M&A
advisors (Dittmann et al. 2010). Strategic investors might be interested in joint ventures
with the company they have invested in or are contractors such as customers or suppliers
of their investments. To improve these forms of co-operation, they must ensure that the
manager they find in these companies is someone they can work with. To understand
this decision process we revert to the social network theory. Researchers found that it is
a natural group-building process to pick a member of one’s own social network (Jehn
et al. 1999). This results in the board composition being a reflection of the deciders social
network (Lynall et al. 2003). By choosing people from within their network with similar
demographic attributes6 such as race or gender (following the homophily principal of
McPherson et al. 2001), they expect to maximise the probability that the manager meets
their expectations. Due to their homophily-influenced thinking (McPherson et al. 2001)
and their social networks as external labour pools, they do not believe in women’s ability to
be good managers and convenient business partners. Thus, we expect banks and insurance
companies, as well as strategic investors, to have a negative impact on the acceptance of
women on management boards.
H2b: The more shares are owned by banks or insurance companies, the lower is the
probability of having at least one woman on the management board.
H2c: The more shares are owned by strategic investors such as non-financial companies
or the government, the lower is the probability of having at least one woman on the
management board.
With institutional investors, we come to a group of owners whose major interest is value
maximisation.As professional investors whose only business activity is the management of
investments, the success of institutional investors is solely measured by the value proposi-
tion of their investments (Thomsen and Pedersen 2000). Their own survival depends on the
performance and success of their investments (Chaganti and Damanpour 1991). To achieve
this objective, institutional investors exhibit a strong level of activity: they are involved in
many strategic decisions related to their investments (e.g., they have a positive effect on the
performance sensitivity of CEO compensation (Dharwadkar et al. 2008)). Concerning the
kind of decisions institutional investors are involved in, they are usually very active in the
sustainable behaviour of the companies they invest in. They divest from companies that do
not fulfil their expectations in terms of sustainability. Sustainable companies are expected
to be more successful und provide large profits in the long run. The Norwegian Government
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Pension Fund, for example, sold its shares of Wal-Mart due to violations of labour rights.
They also terminated their engagements with Boeing and EADS because of involvements
in the production of nuclear weapons. The Norwegian fund excludes all companies from
their portfolio that do not fulfil its social, ethical and environmental requirements (Simp-
son et al. 2008). This desire for sustainable change also plays a major role concerning
the active involvement of institutional owners in decisions on the companies’ corporate
governance structure (Carleton et al. 1998). They aim to break open out-dated corporate
governance patterns (such as dominantly male management board members) and thereby
help to increase the diversity on management boards (Carter et al. 2003) Therefore, we
expect that the investment of institutional owners has a positive effect on the presence of
women among management board members.
H2d: The more shares are owned by institutional owners, the higher is the probability of
having at least one woman on the management board.
Institutional owners should be investigated in particular detail when studying a German
sample and we must distinguish between national and foreign institutional investors. The
bank-orientation of the German corporate governance system (Conyon and Schwalbach
2000; Deeg 2005; Edwards and Nibler 2000; Franks and Mayer 2001) plays a decisive
role for national institutional investors. Most of the national institutional investors do not
act independently, but are bank subsidiaries (Böhler et al. 2010). As a bank subsidiary,
their objectives are aligned with those of the bank. They are embedded in the same social
network as banks and therefore access the same primarily male external labour pool when
deciding on suitable candidates. Foreign institutional investors, on the other hand, are the
genuinely active institutional investors described in the paragraph above. They pursue the
objectives of sustainable and long-term oriented value proposition and maximisation. In
addition, foreign investors are exposed to higher information costs (Ahearne et al. 2004)
and higher monitoring costs in cases of poor governance than local investors (Leuz et al.
2009). It has been shown that the investment decisions of foreign institutional investors
are driven by aspects of transparency (Aggarwal et al. 2005). Hence, once an investment
has been made, for foreigner institutional owners, it is even more important to implement
corporate governance patterns that they can trust. In this way, they avoid the reproduction
of the established national management elite, which is primarily male, and use a more
diversified external pool of candidates. This increases the probability of a woman being
appointed and thereby has a positive impact on the presence of women on the management
board.
H3: Only foreign active owners have a positive influence on the probability of having at
least one woman on the management board.
4 Sample and data
4.1 Sample definition
Our initial sample consisted of all companies listed in the German CDAX between 2000
and 2007.7 We removed all companies with foreign ISINs, since they have their origin
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in countries with different corporate governance systems (most often one-tier systems)
which would complicate comparison across companies. To avoid double-counting, we
also removed all companies that were listed twice with their common and their preferred
stock. We ended up with 5,455 company years. All our data is hand collected from annual
reports such as Hoppensted Aktienführer or the Lexis-Nexis database or by request to the
investor relationship departments because no database exists that contains information on
the composition of management boards and their members’ gender in Germany. Extrac-
tion of the details of the corresponding 15,976 management board member positions was
completed in the following way: we matched three criteria (first name, surname and resi-
dence) to check if any two list entries were for the same person. The data in Hoppenstedt
Aktienführer were partly inconsistent and therefore had to be cleaned; for example, the
names were often written in different ways due to typographical errors or inconsistent
notations for double-barrelled names (e.g., “Hans-Werner”, “Hans-W.”). Similar incon-
sistencies were present within the data containing information about area of residence,
since sometimes the city and sometimes the suburb was mentioned. To identify possible
misleading information, we sorted the list according to first names and then compared
each row with the following and previous rows. We double-checked all the cases we were
unsure about by collecting information from annual reports. This was made possible since
every company listed in the German CDAX must report all members of its management
board in the annual report. We repeated the whole procedure for the list sorted by surnames.
Following this procedure, we collected data for 5,203 company years.
Based on a list of typical male and female first names, we identified the gender of the
15,976 management board member positions. Whenever the classification was unclear,
we investigated the person’s gender further. This way, we obtained data for the number of
women on management boards. In Table 1, we report annual statistics of the management
board members. We report the number of companies whose management boards we found
Table 1: Sample description
Year Number of firms Management board members Women on management boards
Total number Average Total number Average
2000 709 2409 3.3977 44 0.0183
2001 717 2373 3.3096 49 0.0206
2002 682 2173 3.1862 44 0.0202
2003 646 1910 2.9567 43 0.0225
2004 621 1793 2.8873 38 0.0212
2005 607 1762 2.9028 44 0.0250
2006 610 1773 2.9066 43 0.0243
2007 611 1783 2.9182 44 0.0247
All 5203 15976 3.0705 349 0.0218
This table provides general information on the sample. The sample includes the number of
companies based on all companies listed in the German CDAX for the specific year, excluding all
double listings (common and preferred shares of a company are both listed) and foreign ISINs. We
found board information for 95% of these companies (5,203 out of 5,455)
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Table 2: Distribution by industry
Industry Number of firms Management board Women on management
members boards
Total number Average Total number Average
Automobile 17 69 4.0588 0 0.0000
Banks 10 48 4.8000 1 0.0208
Basic resources 8 24 3.0000 0 0.0000
Chemicals 15 58 3.8667 1 0.0172
Construction 15 58 3.8667 0 0.0000
Consumer 44 121 2.7500 6 0.0496
Financial services 92 239 2.5978 7 0.0293
Food & Beverages 15 36 2.4000 0 0.0000
Industrial 121 352 2.9091 6 0.0170
Insurance 9 61 6.7778 3 0.0492
Media 40 101 2.5250 2 0.0198
Pharma & Healthcare 45 132 2.9333 9 0.0682
Retail 28 75 2.6786 1 0.0133
Software 93 221 2.3763 7 0.0317
Technology 30 86 2.8667 1 0.0116
Tel ecommunication 10 28 2.8000 0 0.0000
Transportation & Logistics 11 41 3.7273 0 0.0000
Utilities 8 33 4.1250 0 0.0000
This table presents the distribution of women on German management boards by industry
information on, the total number of managers we analysed and the absolute and average
numbers of female managers. Among the 15,976 management board member positions,
we found a total of 349 female management board member positions.
Tables 2 and 3 present the distribution of women on German management boards
across different industries and companies of different sizes. Table 2 shows that the highest
number of women on management boards were found especially in companies affiliated
to the pharmaceutical industry, or in consumer goods companies. Two explanations are
possible for this effect—the supply and the demand argument. According to the idea of
women supply, one might expect more women in industries with more female employees
(Hillman et al. 2007). Companies in these industries should have a higher proportion of
female board members since we do not expect them to “waste the resources of female
talent” by leaving them in lower hierarchy levels or even allowing them to resign from
their position at this company (Broome 2008).8 The women demand represents the need
for women because of women-specific topics. The stakeholders of many companies, such
as customers and (potential) employees, are women. To support legitimacy, the board
should echo this company environment (Lynall et al. 2003).
The distribution by company size in Table 3 shows that very small companies with less
than 100 employees in particular have a higher percentage of women on their management
boards.A possible explanation might be that these companies are mostly family businesses
which appoint family members to the management board.
Information on the ownership structure is extracted from the Thomson Financial
database. This database includes every investor that owns at least 0.5% of the company’s
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Table 3: Distribution by company size
Management board members Women on management boards
Total number Average Total number Average
Number of Number of
employees firms
1–100 104 222 2.1346 11 0.0495
100–500 145 367 2.5310 9 0.0245
500–1000 65 170 2.6154 4 0.0235
1000–5000 119 371 3.1176 10 0.0270
5000–10000 37 131 3.5405 2 0.0153
10000–50000 42 200 4.7619 4 0.0200
>50000 99 322 3.2525 4 0.0124
This table presents the distribution of women on German management boards by company size.
Size is measured by the number of employees
common stock. In case of obvious inconsistencies, we double-checked the data with infor-
mation from the Hoppenstedt Aktienführer or from annual reports, and made corrections if
necessary. Regarding the adjusted sample, we achieved an availability of 4,170 company
years. Board characteristics such as size and tenure of the supervisory board were extracted
from Hoppenstedt Aktienführer in the same way as the information on management board
members. To measure the supervisory board members’ tenure for the first years of our
samples correctly, we went even further back in time and collected data starting in 1992.
Company characteristics such as the number of employees, performance and information
on the companies’ diversification were collected from Thomson Datastream Worldscope
and are available for between 4,561 and 5,267 company years.
Due to the need for simultaneous availability of all the variables used, we ended up
with 3,678 company years for our multivariate regression models.
4.2 Variables
The endogenous variable in our statistical models is female manager. This is a dummy
variable indicating if the specific company has a woman among the management board
members.
The exogenous variables can be categorised as either ownership, board or company
characteristics. The determination of the endogenous and exogenous variables is based
on the recent research explaining the presence of women on boards (Gregoric et al. 2010;
Harrigan 1981; Hillman et al. 2007).
Within the variables of ownership structures, we analysed the impact of the freefloat
and in further models distinguish between four different types of owners as follows: in-
dividual investors that include individual owners or families such as the Porsche family;
banks and insurance companies; strategic investors such as corporations or government
agencies; and institutional investors such as investment funds, private equity investors,
venture capitalists and hedge funds. For the active owners, we also distinguished between
institutional investors national, indicating that the owners are based in Germany, and insti-
tutional investors foreign, for owners based abroad. All ownership variables are expressed
in percentage and indicate which percentage of the shares is held by the specific type of
owner.
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In addition, we controlled for the following management and supervisory board char-
acteristics: size management board represents the number of management board members,
size supervisory board counts the number of shareholder representatives in the supervisory
board9 and codet indicates the type of codetermination. This variable can take the values
zero (in the case of no codetermination), 0.5 (in the case of one-third codetermination) and
one (in the case of parity codetermination). Tenure is the average tenure of all shareholder
representatives on the supervisory board.
For company-specific control variables, we considered size, which is approximated
through the natural logarithm of the number of employees; diversification, for which
we counted the number of industries the company is conducting business with based on
the four-digit SIC logic; leverage as the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt and
common equity; founded age as the companies’ age; and among our robustness checks,
performance as the ROIC (return on invested capital) of the company. In every model,
we additionally controlled for industry affiliation based on the information provided by
the German stock exchange. Table 4 summarises all used variables, their means, medians
Table 4: Data description
Variable No. of Mean Median VIFs 1.1 VIFs 1.2 VIFs 1.3
observations
Ownership Structure
Freefloat 4170 41.4305 38.0600 1.0822
Individual investors 4170 22.5603 8.4150 1.9694 1.9695
Banks and Insurance companies 4170 0.9063 0.0000 1.1201 1.1201
Strategic investors 4170 24.7178 7.2700 2.0890 2.0915
Institutional investor 4170 10.3851 4.8650 1.5557
Institutional investor national 4170 5.8508 1.7900 1.2910
Institutional investor foreign 4170 4.5343 0.0000 1.3376
Board Characteristics
Female manager (0,1) 5203 0.0661 0.0000 – – –
Size management board 5203 3.0705 3.0000 2.0002 2.0136 2.0141
Size supervisory board 5268 4.7764 4.0000 2.2243 2.2928 2.2952
Codetermination (0,0.5,1) 5267 0.3144 0.0000 3.1730 3.2031 3.2073
Tenure 5267 3.2237 3.0000 1.4327 1.4668 1.4746
Firm Characteristics
Size 4561 6.6048 6.4907 3.8052 3.8236 3.8242
Diversification 5240 3.7664 3.0000 1.5045 1.5139 1.5210
Performance 5267 4.8086 6.7200 – – –
Leverage 4672 0.2106 0.1528 1.1498 1.1535 1.1536
Founded Age 5247 48.8938 22.0000 1.6334 1.6541 1.6565
This table provides descriptive statistics for the companies in our sample. The initial sample
consisted of 6,295 company years for the years 2000 to 2007, whereas the descriptive statistics
for the single variables were based on individual numbers of company years, depending on the
availability, range between 4,170 and 5,267 company years. Companies are included when they
are listed at the CDAX of the German stock exchange for the specific year, excluding all double
listings (common and preferred shares of a company are both listed) and foreign ISINs. The table
represents the mean, median and the variance inflation factors of regression model 1.1–1.3
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and standard deviations. A table of variable descriptions and the used sources per variable
can be found in Table 6 in the appendix. Additionally, Table 4 contains the variance
inflation factors (VIFs) of our regression models to challenge potential problems of multi-
collinearity. A discussion of the values can be found in paragraph 5.3.
5 Empirical analyses
To test our hypotheses, we created a logistic regression model. We introduced the empirical
design, discuss our empirical results and closed with robustness tests.
5.1 Empirical design
To investigate the impact of ownership characteristics on the representation of women in
management boards empirically, we analysed several variants of the following multivariate
model specification:
Female manager = f (ownership structure, board characteristics,
company characteristics)
(1)
Since the endogenous variable of our model—female manager—is a binary variable, we
used a logistic regression (Hoetker 2007). To investigate the impact of the ownership
structure, we took the following three-step approach: the control variables for board and
company characteristics are included in every model. To measure the impact of the own-
ers’ model, model 1.1 only contains freefloat. In model 1.2, we replaced freefloat with
the four variables indicating the type of owner: individual investors, banks and insur-
ance companies, strategic investors and institutional investors. For model 1.3, we chose a
more detailed classification of the active owners using the variables institutional investors
national and institutional investors foreign.
To challenge the model quality, we also considered the possible problems of het-
eroscedasticity and multi-collinearity. To resolve the problem of heteroscedasticity, we
used Huber/White (QML) standard errors (Freedman 2006), and to detect potential prob-
lems of multi-collinearity, we calculated the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all models.
5.2 Empirical results
Table 5 represents the results of the estimation of our logit-model.
Model 1.1 shows that ownership concentration (defined as 1 minus freefloat in percent
divided by 100) generally has no statistically significant effect on the likelihood of having a
woman among the management board members. This means that we cannot give evidence
if the existence of a dominant owner affects the probability of having at least one female
manager, meaning that hypothesis 1 cannot be confirmed.
The influence of specific types of owners is investigated in models 1.2 and 1.3. Both
models show that individual investors have a significant positive effect on the probability of
having at least one woman among the management board members. Therefore, hypothesis
H2a can be confirmed: private owners have more female representatives on the manage-
ment boards of the companies they own. However, shares owned by banks and insurance
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companies and strategic investors do not have any significant effect on the probability of
having at least one woman among the management board members. Hence, hypotheses
H2b and H2c, which stated that male-dominated banks and corporations mainly support
male managers, cannot be confirmed. Moreover, the signs of both coefficients are positive,
and not negative as expected. However, since the coefficients are not significant in any
model, we were not able to show a positive effect of either banks and insurance companies
or strategic investors.
The effect of institutional investors on the probability of having at least one woman
among the management board members in model 1.2 is significantly positive. That is to say,
hypothesis H2d can be confirmed: active owners positively affect the strategic decisions
concerning the management board’s composition. This result is consistent with the studies
by Carleton et al. (1998) and Farrell and Hersch (2005).
The separate consideration of national and foreign active investors can be found in
model 1.3. The regression demonstrates that the positive effect of active owners on the
probability of having at least one woman among the management board members only
holds for owners based abroad, and not for the German ones. The variable institutional
investors foreign has a significantly positive coefficient, whereas the positive coefficient
of institutional investors national is not significant. This results in a confirmation of hy-
pothesis H3.
The results for our control variables are the following: the size of the management
board has a positive effect on the probability of having a woman on the management
board. This is feasible since the possibility to enhance diversity is higher in larger groups.
We also find a positive effect of codetermination on the probability of having a woman on
the management board. This might be caused by the presence of union representatives who
increase the companies’ awareness of the importance of equality. For the average tenure
of the management board members we find a significant negative effect on the probability
of having at least one woman on the management board. This result can be explained
via the stability of the board composition, at which the high tenure can be seen as an
approximation for stability. The more fluctuation a board has, the higher the possibility to
also appoint a woman at some point of time.
Additionally the company control variables support the idea of young and small com-
panies having women on the management board more frequently: the company size has
a significantly negative coefficient also the influence of the founded age is significantly
negative.
5.3 Model quality and robustness tests
To challenge the model quality, we paid attention to the potential problems of heteroscedas-
ticity and multi-collinearity. To resolve the heteroscedasticity problem, we used Hu-
ber/White (QML) standard errors (Freedman 2006). Multi-collinearity is not of concern
since, apart from codetermination and company size, the variance inflation factors (VIFs)
do not exceed 3. The VIFs for model 1.3 are displayed in Table 4.
To examine the robustness of our results, we considered the following three dimensions:
selection bias, choice of endogenous variable and choice of exogenous variables.10 All
robustness tables can be found in the appendix.
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To eliminate any concerns about a selection bias driven by the lower availability of
ownership data, we used a Heckit regressions model that includes a Heckman correction
term. Following Sigelman and Zeng’s (1999) example, we took a two-step approach to
build a Heckit model (Siegelman and Zeng 1999). In the first step we performed a logit
regression model with the existence of ownership data as the binary dependent variable.
We used year dummies as explanatory variables within this model and a HDAX dummy
and an event variable to explain the probability of missing ownership data. The year
dummies should control for time effects, the HDAX-dummy11 for potential size effects
and the event variable for events such as delisting, insolvency, etc. that could lead to
missing data. The event variable is a count variable (with a maximum value of ten), which
counts the number of company years for which data are available within the Hoppenstedt
Aktienführer. Because the Hoppenstedt Aktienführer is supposed to cover all German-
listed companies, we expect that missing years are an appropriate proxy for special events
such as delistings or insolvencies. In the second step, we used the results of the logit
regression to calculate the inverse Mills ratios. We then expanded our regression models
1.1–1.3 by including the inverse Mills ratio as an additional independent variable. As
Table 7 in the appendix shows, our results remain qualitatively identical. Therefore, we
exclude sample selection biases within our regression models.
To consider the robustness of the endogenous variable, we replaced the dummy variable
female manager with number of female managers. Since we thereby replaced a binary
variable with a count variable, changes in terms of methodology were also necessary.
Models explaining count variables are calculated using a poisson regression (Farrell and
Hersch 2005). Our results are also qualitatively stable for this change (see Table 8 in
the appendix). The results are therefore robust concerning the choice of the endogenous
variable.
With respect to the choice of exogenous variables, we made two changes: First, we
calculated our models without the variable codetermination. Second, we included a per-
formance measure in our models. Tables 9 and 10 in the appendix show that neither of
these two changes had an effect on our results. Our results can therefore be considered as
robust in relation to the choice of exogenous measures.
6 Discussion
This paper analyses the impact of ownership structure on the presence of women on
management boards. In 2007, just 2.47% of the management board members of German
companies were female. In other words, German companies do not use nearly 50% of the
country’s intellectual capacity in management positions. The purpose of our study was to
investigate if ownership concentration and the specific type of owner have had an influence
on this percentage.
We arrived at the following results. We did not find any evidence that ownership
concentration influences the presence of women on management boards. As argued in our
hypotheses strong owners have the power to influence the composition of the management
board and thereby as the case may be disturb the reproduction of same types of managers
over generation. Our results however do not show any significantly positive impact on the
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presence of women among management board members. This means that the power to
have the possibility for change is not enough. Owners also need a special interest to favor
female managers. We therefore distinguished between different types of investors and we
found significant positive effects on the presence of women on management boards; the
concentration of individual as well as institutional owners positively affects the probability
of having female management board members. However our results do not show any
evidence for a negative effect of banks and insurance companies or strategic investors on
the presence of women on management boards. The demographic reflection of the social
network of the deciders in banks and strategic investors seems to be non-existent for the
case of management board compensation. A further separation of the institutional owners
into national and foreign owners illustrates that only the foreign institutional owners drive
the positive effect. It is not only important to be an institutional owner but it is also of
relevance what kind of institutional experiences the active owner bases its behaviour on.
German-based funds are directly confronted with a family policy that detracts female
careers, and thus they do not dare to force women into management positions. In contrast,
foreign investors know that careers are possible for females and therefore they actively
support them.
This research study adds to the recent public and political discussion in the following
way: We have shown that specific corporate governance institutions exist—blockholders
and in particular families and foreign institutional owners—who act in favour of women
on management boards. However, it is unclear if their effect is strong enough to enable
the country’s regulators to relinquish on further actions. One specific measure that is often
discussed in this regard is a binding quota regulation as already implemented for exam-
ple in Norway (Ahern and Dittmar 2010; Bøhren and Strøm 2010; Gregoric et al. 2010).
Whether this is an effective measure was not part of our investigation and has to be critically
debated by politicians. In this debate, legislators should contrast the many disadvantages
of quota regulations with the alleged advantage of increasing the number of female board
members. By forcing companies to recruit a specific number of women onto their boards,
the numbers will grow. But will the situation of women in management positions improve
sustainably? Actions against discrimination quite often result in reinforcement of preju-
dices and stereotypes (Coate and Loury 1993; Franck and Jungwirth 1998). Women who
have achieved management positions as a result of the quota regulation will be exposed
to the general suspicion of being a “quota woman”. Moreover, many opportunities remain
for male managers to exclude women from important decisions, such as through informal
meetings that the legislator cannot regulate.
For a sustainable reform of female career opportunities, the legislator is strongly de-
pendent on the commitment and the will of the companies. Instead of implementing the
hard law of a quota, soft laws might be a possibility to boost the companies’ commitment
(Aguilera et al. 2008). One possibility of a soft law would be the following extension of
the Corporate Governance Codex: companies could be forced to publish the percentage
of women included in the first three management levels. As a result, an external social
pressure could be created for companies with few or no women among their managers and
directors. The resulting disadvantages of this social pressure for the companies would in-
clude negative profiling on the labour market for young female talent and the possible loss
of image amongst female customers. Currently, the German Corporate Governance Codex
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only stresses adequate consideration in management and supervisory boards (Weber-Rey
2009).
For companies our research results have the following consequences. The evaluation
of the company by the capital market is of high relevance. Since there is actually no type
of owners that is acting against the favour of women in management position, they do
not have to fear penalisation of the capital market of measurements to increase career
opportunities of women in their company.
7 Study limitations and future research suggestions
This paper is not without limitations: First, we used only publically available data. Using
data originating from databases such as Datastream and annual reports, we were able to
model good indicators for owners’ behaviour concerning the support of women in top
management positions. However, we did not concretely measure their preferences at an
individual level. To do so, in-depth interviews with representatives of the owners would
be necessary. Admittedly, this kind of data often affiliates with strong selection biases.
Only persons who are affected by the issue of interest, or are actively interested in the
topic of the interview, are willing to participate. In summary, neither of the two methods
might be able to extract the pure investors’ preferences and behaviour without any mea-
surement issues. We decided to suspend the bias due to the willingness to participate in
interviews, and in return to accept the high level of abstraction of the publically avail-
able data on company level. Nevertheless, interview-based investigations in this field of
research might be an interesting extension to our study and provide a direction for future
research. Second, our analyses investigated which factors explain the presence of women
on management boards (the probability of having been appointed and not having been
dismissed). Another possible investigation could be the analysis of concrete appointment
decisions. However, to have a representative number of cases, a larger sample would be
necessary. Extending the given sample to the future would probably result in biases due to
the recently intensified public discussion on quota regulations. But this could also be an
advantageous opportunity to measure and investigate quota effects. This brings us to the
third limitation: While we provide further insights on the mechanisms that increase the
percentage of women on management boards, we do not answer the question of whether
a quota regulation could be effective and whether it is needed. One way to approach this
research question would be the extension of the analysis over more countries, covering
some societies that have already introduced a quota regulation. Such investigation of an
international sample would also enable researchers to identify institutional drivers, such
as the impact of a country’s family policy on the presence of women in top management
positions. Research of this kind might also enable evaluating family political mechanisms
and give answers on the question why Germany still has very few women in management
positions though housekeeping expenses are deductable from income tax. Fourth, in our
study, we only focused on the highest possible management positions—the management
board. An analysis of drivers—institutional or organisational—of women in middle man-
agement positions would supplement our research and give companies concrete advice on
how to increase the percentage of women at every hierarchical level.
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Beyond that, our paper provides possible directions for future research on board diver-
sity: For example, our analyses could be extended to include other diversity dimensions.
The gender variable used in our study is only one demographical category (Randel 2002)
and could be extended to include age or nationality. Investigation of diversity in terms
of educational and professional background would also further broaden our knowledge
of the drivers and impacts of diversity in top management teams. In particular, research
covering more than one diversity dimension simultaneously would be of high relevance.
The underlying theoretical concept might hereby be the theory of faultlines (Tuggle et al.
2010).
Endnotes
1 http:/ /www.welt.de / wirtschaft / article12923472/Ministerin-lobt-Frauenfoerderung-deutscher-
Firmen.html, 15.06.2011.
2 Compare e.g. Elston and Goldberg (2003) and Rapp and Wolff (2010) on the influence of owners
on aspects of management compensation (Elston and Goldberg 2003; Rapp and Wolff 2010) or
Carleton et al. (1998) and Chizema and Kim (2010) on the impact of owners on the board
composition (Carleton et al. 1998; Chizema and Kim 2010).
3 Our empirical research is based on a German sample. The German corporate governance system
is a two-tier system. It distinguishes between management board members—comparable to the
executive board members in the Anglo-Saxon one-tier system used in the U.S.—and supervisory
board members—the outside board members in the U.S. system (Baums and Scott 2005; Douma
1997). Our empirical investigation focuses on management board members.
4 Most of the papers cited analyse the drivers for women on boards or women in top management
teams. The majority of papers analysing women on boards are based on US data. Since the US
has a one-tier corporate governance system, in contrast to Germany, no further separation into
management and supervisory board members can be achieved.
5 For the consideration of non-financial companies as strategic investors also compare withAndres
(2008).
6 British studies showed that banking was 2007 with 14% women among all board members
the 5th out of ten industries concerning female representatives on board (Sealy et al. 2007).
For German numbers compare Table 2 of this article. 2007 only two percent of the management
board members of banks and five percent of insurance management board members were female.
7 The CDAX is the Composite Deutscher Aktien Index, which includes all companies fulfilling the
Prime or General Standard at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. In Europe, companies can generally
choose between two different points of access to equity capital markets. Beside an EU-regulated
market, most exchanges offer a market regulated by itself. The two markets differ with respect to
legal basis and status, but also with respect to differences in transparency requirements. Within
the EU-regulated market, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FWB—Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse),
which is the most important German stock exchange, allows companies to be listed in one of
two different market segments. While companies willing to fulfil the EU-regulated minimum
transparency level only have to be listed in the General Standard, companies opting for a listing
in the Prime Standard must fulfil additional transparency requirements. Accordingly, the Prime
Standard is the market segment with the highest reporting and disclosure level at the most
important German stock exchange.
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8 An additional supply-driven argument bases on the age of companies: In young companies the
hierarchies are still flat. The probability for a woman working in this young company to become a
member of the management is therefore greater. This explains e.g. the relatively high percentage
of women on management boards in the software industry.
9 The German law imposes some restrictions concerning the size of the supervisory board. The
maximum size allowed depends on the equity capital: for more than ten millions in equity
the maximum number of supervisory board members is 21, for between 1,5 and ten million,
it is 15 members and for less than 1,5 nine members are allowed at maximum (§ 95 AktG).
For codetermined companies there are additional rules depending on the number of employees
in Germany: in the case of more than 20.000 employees the company has to have more ten
shareholder representatives (and ten employee representatives), between 10,000 and 20,000 the
imposed number of shareholder representatives is eight (and eight employee representatives) and
for between 2,000 and 10,000 employees companies must have six shareholder and six employee
representatives (§ 7(1) MitbestG.). However, the variance inflation factors (Table 4) show that
multi-collinearity due to the close relation to firm size is not a problem and does not affect our
empirical model quality.
10 To challenge the robustness of the used method, a logit regression, we additionally conduct a
propensity score matching according to Becker and Ichino (2002). We first determined a control
group for the companies with women on their management boards based on the control variables
used in model 1.3 and calculated the t-values for the important ownership variables (Becker and
Ichino 2002) using the nearest neighbourhood approach (Ivanov and Xie 2010). With t-values
of 1.55 for individual investor 1.53 for institutional investor, and 1.89 for institutional investor
foreign the first two variables are almost significant and the third is significant to a level of 10%.
Our results can therefore be considered as robust regarding the choice of method.
11 The HDAX-dummy takes the value of one if the company was listed in the HDAX-Index,
which is a combination of the three important German indices DAX, MDAX. After the index
restructuring, this index also included the TecDAX.
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Appendix
Table 6: Definition of variables and data sources
Variable Description Source
Ownership Structure
Freefloat Percentage of shares that are




Individual investors Percentage of shares that are







Percentage of shares that are





Strategic investors Percentage of shares that are






Institutional investor Percentage of shares that are






Percentage of shares that are







Percentage of shares that are















Codetermination (0,0.5,1) Variable that indicates the kind
of codetermination existing in
the company; equals zero in
case of no codetermination, 0.5
in case of one-third

















Diversification Number of business segments
the firm is operating in
Thomson
Datastream/Worldscope




Founded-Age Age since foundation Annual reports, IR requests
Industrie Affiliation Dummy variables that indicated
industry affiliation
German Stock Exchange
This table describes the set of variables used for our analyses
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